















Unintended consequences of statebuilding and the 
management of diversity in post-conflict Kosovo 
 
Author: Marius-Ionut Calu 
 
Journal:  Nationalities Papers 
Manuscript ID  CNAP-2016-0046.R2 
Manuscript Type:  Original Article 






Unintended consequences of statebuilding and the management of 
diversity in post-conflict Kosovo 
Author: Marius-Ionut Calu 
 
Abstract: 
This paper examines the adoption of a multiethnic liberal democratic model of 
governance in post-independence Kosovo and the dual task of statebuilding to secure 
unity and manage diversity. This article explains why in post-conflict and post-
independence Kosovo, its domestic sovereignty and legitimisation have become 
conditioned by the integration, accommodation and protection of its minorities.          
While the existing literature has mainly focused on the shortcomings deriving from the 
exogenous character of statebuilding in Kosovo, this paper aims to challenge and 
complement this view by drawing on the ‘state-in-society’ approach developed by Joel 
Migdal, which highlights that the actual states have less coherence than their 
theoretical counterparts. Therefore, the inclusion of endogenous factors offers a deeper 
understanding of how the state model designed for Kosovo has been transformed and 
“limited” by local idiosyncrasies. The analysis of post-independence governance in 
Kosovo reveals the legislation-implementation gap and the varying levels of 
integration as well as the tensions and the unintended consequences arising from the 
priority to address the situation of the Serb community. Overall, this article shows that 
multiethnic statebuilding in Kosovo has been crucially limited by endogenous 
conditions and that the state-society relationship remains largely undefined.  
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The presence of minority groups with different ethnic, national, cultural, 
religious or linguistic identities within almost all contemporary societies has gradually 
gained more significance for both long-established and new states, particularly in post-
conflict, post-communist and post-colonial contexts. Consequently, contemporary 
processes of state formation have included the management of diversity as a highly 
prioritised task in response to the historical changes in the practice and understanding 
of the relationship between state and society. In other words, the modern state has 
become more preoccupied with finding solutions for the integration, accommodation 
and protection of all its constituent peoples. 
Through qualitative data analysis consisting of the evaluation of the 
constitution, laws, policy-briefs, official local and international documents, treaties, 
reports, political debates, conferences and, most significantly, by conducting semi-
structured interviews during 8 months of fieldwork in Kosovo in 2012 and 2013, this 
article analyses and measures the impact of adopting a liberal-democratic state-model 
that aims to secure unity at the same time with accommodating diversity by looking 
at the process of statebuilding in post-conflict and post-independence Kosovo: Why, 
how and to what extent has Kosovo been able to manage diversity as part of 
statebuilding by adopting a multiethnic legal and institutional framework designed to 
integrate, accommodate and protect the ethnic minority groups within its territory? 
In order to answer this complex question, one must acknowledge that the 
management of ethnic diversity has been a fundamental challenge for Kosovo after 
its break-up from Serbia in the post-conflict and post-independence context as 
reflected by the interplay of three core statebuilding tasks:  
1) the development of institutions, the implementation of a legal framework 
(institution-building/ setting-up the constitution, legal framework, 
democratization) and enshrining core liberal-democratic values; 
2) post-ethnic conflict reconciliation through legislative and institutional power-
sharing arrangements designed to foster inter-ethnic cooperation and 
accommodation of minorities (mainly between minority Serbs and majority 
Albanians), and  
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3) the generic integration and protection of all other ethnic minorities (Bosniak, 
Turkish, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani, Montenegrin and Croat 
communities in Kosovo). 
This article reflects on the central elements of statebuilding in Kosovo and 
analyses some of the particularities of this multifaceted case-study, while also 
discussing its relevance for the general study of the increasingly symbiotic 
relationship between processes of state formation and the management of diversity.                              
The first part will examine the conceptual framework that investigates why the 
management of diversity has become a vital part of modern liberal-democratic state-
formation. The second part of this article will exemplify this by mainly looking at the 
twofold objective in Kosovo to secure unity and to accommodate the Serb 
community, representing its largest minority and politically the most difficult 
community to manage within the new state. This will help examine some of the key 
intended and unintended consequences of adopting a multiethnic 
constitutional/institutional framework in Kosovo, as indicated by the gap between de 
jure and de facto implementation and by the lack of congruence between nation and 
state. Altogether, this article links the case of Kosovo to Joel Migdal’s conceptual 
view of the “limited” state (Migdal 2001) and re-emphasises the state-society 
relationship as the core element of building and maintaining modern liberal-
democratic governance. 
 
1. Management of diversity as challenge and as objective for statebuilding 
 
Given that the liberal-democratic (nation-state) model has become the dominant 
form of modern political organization of states, it is essential to understand how the 
mutual relationship between state and society, between rulers and subject, between 
institutions and people has transformed over time. Furthermore, while most Western 
and other long established states “are the result of centuries of context-specific social 
conflict, historically contingent processes and institutional learning and adaptation” 
(Egnell and Halden, 2013, 1), contemporary new states are limited by their little 
experience of building and consolidating their sovereignty, legitimacy and capacity 
to offer security, socio-economic development and justice within its territory and in 
relation to the other states on international arena.  
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Consequently, the ability to manage diversity and the solutions adopted for this 
purpose are also very different from what long established states have been practicing. 
In this sense, the recognition, integration and protection of minorities have become 
essential features of modern liberal-democratic state-formation and even more so for 
contemporary post-ethnic conflict statebuilding cases, where political authority needs 
to be legitimized by all the constituent peoples.  
Drawing on Joel Migdal’s “state in society” approach (Migdal 2001), I adopt a 
view of the state as intrinsically embedded in society, thus reflecting the symbiotic 
state-society relationship confirmed by the mutual capacity to transform each other.  
From this perspective, the state is both the “image” of a unitary and clearly bounded 
political organization in control of a given territory and the “practices” of its different 
social actors and agencies. (Migdal 2001, 18). The state is not a fixed political entity 
and it can be seen as a process, as a changing form of political organization responding 
to the impact of society. Therefore, the analysis of the statebuilding process in Kosovo 
and of the impact of adopting a multiethnic liberal-democratic state model is focused 
on the character of the state-society link.  
Moreover, one way of understanding and evaluating the progress and results of 
statebuilding in Kosovo is by looking at the state’s ability to develop and maintain 
what Migdal describes as “social control”, indicated by the level of compliance, 
participation and legitimacy awarded by the people. In this sense, given the important 
role of minorities in legitimising a post-conflict state, the promotion and protection of 
minority rights is an indicator of Kosovo’s willingness and capacity to deliver 
essential political goods. This becomes a vital responsibility if the state has also 
experienced major discrimination of a certain ethnic group and/or a history of ethnic 
conflict, similarly to the case of Kosovo.              
Furthermore, this also helps to understand Kosovo’s efforts to develop domestic 
sovereignty, which for Stephen Krasner refers to the actual strength of a state’s 
authority, as well as its capacity to use it effectively and secure legitimacy (Krasner 
1999). Political consensus and social cohesion are considered to be essential factors 
that work in favour of building a steady democracy, while political disagreement and 
deep social division are made responsible for the instability and potential breakdown. 
When trying to understand what kind of state the international community has 
attempted to build in Kosovo, a useful model is that of the democratic legal authority, 
which according to Richard Ponzio is “based on a belief, by the people in a 
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geographically defined polity, in the legality of democratically enacted rules and the 
right of democratic authorities to issue commands under such rules” (Ponzio 2011, 
35). If this is the objective of post-conflict statebuilding missions, then the 
understanding of authority is essential for the functionality of statebuilding processes. 
However, the “gap in conceptions of authority” (Ponzio 2011, 35) between 
international officials and the local population could represent the key challenge to 
all contemporary attempts to implement democratic legal authority in post-conflict 
societies.  
Equally important is however not only to explore the limits of the management 
of plurality, but also to understand why and how this has become an essential task for 
contemporary statebuilding. In the contexts of post-colonial, post-communist and 
post-conflict statebuilding, diverse societies have been divided by the existence of 
different ethnic, national, cultural, religious or linguistic identities. State formation in 
these cases have been often a response to the intersection or clash between ethno-
national diversity and the spread of the modern Western state model. Consequently, 
the new “polities” have experienced the challenge of internal disputes over 
establishing what the identity of the political community and their members should 
be. This state legitimacy issue has been described by Linz and Stepan (1996) as the 
stateness problem, originating in the relationship between the state, the nation and 
democracy and the difficulties in establishing territorial boundaries and the conditions 
of citizenship.  
Table 1. A typology of State-, Nation- and Democracy-building Strategies in Multinational 




Statebuilding Strategies toward Non-national Minority or Minorities 
        Exclusionary Strategy                      Inclusionary Strategy 
Demos and nation should be 
the same  
Type I Expel or at least  
systematically encourage the “exit” 
option 
Type III Make major efforts 
to assimilate minorities into 
national culture a give no 
special recognition to 
minority political or cultural 
rights 
Demos and nation can be 
different 
Type II Isolate from political process 
by granting civil liberties but no 
political rights and thus discouraging 
“voice” option 
Type IV Make major efforts 
to accommodate minorities 
by crafting a series of 
political and civil 





As the table above shows, while nationalism offers the possibility of defining 
the demos, this may not include the entire population or all the constituent peoples of 
the state. When “stateness” and “nationness” overlap, building democracy and 
legitimate governance is expected to occur more easily, while when they are not in 
congruity, the process is likely to be more challenging and unstable. For instance, 
democratization in post-communist countries like Poland, Czech Republic or 
Hungary are relevant example of the first situation, whereas the conflicts and 
instability of states from former Yugoslavia illustrate “the severe consequences for 
states beset by contentious multinationalism and weak citizen-institutional loyalties” 
(Wilmer 2006, 16). 
The management of diversity has become both a challenge and an objective for 
contemporary processes of state formation. On the one hand, it has been a challenge 
primarily because it complicates the task to secure unity for the liberal-democratic 
nation-state model, built around the norms of popular sovereignty, social solidarity 
and reliance on a dominant nation.  On the other hand, it has become a key objective 
for statebuilding not only because of the social-demographic and political changes of 
the 20th century, but also because of the increasing number of internal (ethnic) 
divisions, conflicts and civil wars. These issues have characterized the ex-colonial 
and ex-communist societies aiming to adopt the liberal state-model but struggling to 
synchronise the (proposed) state-society relationship with the ground realities.  
 
2. Post-conflict statebuilding in Kosovo  
 Kosovo has been the topic of many international controversies and academic 
debates over the politics of interventionism, international law, ethnic cleansing, 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, the role of international administrators in post-
conflict states, secessionism and the right to self-determination and, most recently, 
the problems around the 2008 unilateral declaration of independence. Kosovo has 
therefore declared itself an independent state nine years after the 1999 conflict, but 
the lack of unanimous international recognition continues to divide the international 
community on the status and future of the province. This situation is particularly 
important given that the international community has been involved in all stages of 
Kosovo’s development from intervention (the role of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)), peacebuilding/statebuilding (the administration of Kosovo by 
UNMIK and by the European Union, but also the involvement of other organizations 
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like OSCE and international donors) and post-independence (the continuing primary 
role of the EU thorough the Europeanization process and the EULEX mission).  
In these circumstances, Kosovo has been aiming to foster its international 
recognition and defend its status while also building-up its domestic sovereignty and 
continuing its transition to a sustainable liberal-democracy. In other words, in its post-
2008 quest to meet international/EU standards and construct stable, functional and 
legitimate democratic governance, Kosovo continues to have a highly contested 
statehood and even lacks the support of five EU member states. 
Challenges for contemporary post-conflict statebuilding practices have been 
generally studied within the critique of liberal interventionism (Caplan 2005; 
Chandler 2004 & 2010; Clapham 1996; Hehir 2010; Ignatieff 2003; Jackson 1990 and 
2007; Paris 1997; Richmond and Franks 2009; Samuels and Einsiedel 2004; Yannis 
2001; Zaum 2007). This literature has been focused on the imposing character of 
international involvement in peacekeeping and post-conflict administration such as 
the United Nations-led missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, South 
Sudan or Afghanistan.  
From this perspective, the international involvement in Kosovo has not only 
started with a controversial humanitarian intervention, but it has also imposed a 
multiethnic state model while administering the post-conflict reconstruction of the 
province. This suggests that the international community has also become highly 
responsible for the flaws of statebuilding in Kosovo and for creating a certain degree 
of external dependency in the detriment of democratisation and domestic legitimacy. 
International administration has been identified as the key problem because it installs 
an external source of legitimacy and undermines domestic sovereignty.  
The same literature underlines the non-democratic and illiberal character of 
liberal interventionism in its paradoxical quest to spread liberal-democratic ideals 
through statebuilding missions. At the same time, this criticism also questions the 
self-proclaimed universality of an externally generated political model. The 
identification of the flaws of international statebuilding is not however always 
supported by endogenous, case-specific and convincing explanations for the 
multifaceted causes of why states fail, for instance, to develop sustainable democratic 
governance or to achieve long-term reconciliation and inter-ethnic cooperation.  
Moreover, in the case of Kosovo its unresolved status is often over-emphasised 
and used to explain almost all deficiencies of the statebuilding process, despite the 
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fact that scholars (Tansey 2007; Caspersen 2012; Coggins 2014) have observed that 
processes of democratic transition and institution-building are not unique to 
established states and can occur outside the state system as confirmed by the post-
1999 standards before status approach in Kosovo. This highlights the dynamic 
character of the state under the impact of a multitude of external and internal 
processes. Furthermore, Krasner’s taxonomy of sovereignty is also relevant here 
because despite the absence of international/legal sovereignty, Kosovo has developed 
domestic sovereignty.  
This paper argues that a competing literature (Kostovicova 2005; Kostovicova 
and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009) has been emerging with the aim of stimulating more 
consistent explanations of state weakness. This can be done by highlighting the legacy 
of the past in relation to the absence of social cohesion and a strong state-society 
relationship. This theoretical comparison shows the importance of identifying valid 
causes for malfunctions in statebuilding by complementing exogenous explanations 
with endogenous factors. Liberal-democratic measures and standards that define 
contemporary statebuilding are implemented improperly not necessarily because they 
are imposed and given a different character, but because they are in conflict with the 
internal fracture between the state and its population and because of the 
incompatibility between institutional/legal solutions and case-specific circumstances.  
Indeed, Kosovo represents a unique endeavour and a very ambitious case of 
statebuilding not just because of its internationally contested statehood (Ker-Lindsay 
2009; Hehir 2010; Weller 2009), the circumstances of the 1999 war and the subsequent 
international administration, but also because of the impact of the dual legacy of 
communism and conflict. This paper thus explores why the literature on statebuilding 
in Kosovo has generally not been focusing enough on the role of endogenous factors 
(Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2013).  
It is paramount to explore whether endogenous challenges may obstruct the aims 
of building a multiethnic liberal-democratic state capable of securing unity and 
managing a plural society. In this sense, the “the twin and deeply intertwined dynamics 
of post-Communist and post-conflict transition” (Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
2013, 13) have simultaneously complicated the state-society relationship in Kosovo 
and the externally-led efforts to establish a multiethnic polity. This dual legacy has 
been characterised by illiberal practices and understanding of governance, substate 
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forms of authority, ethnic, social and political fragmentation, the absence of national 
cohesion, economic dependency, institutional weakness and security issues. Following 
on the state-in-society approach developed by Migdal (2001), it can also be affirmed 
that: 
In reality the modern state is both an abstract and coercive macro-
structure and a network of interdependent social actions in everyday 
life. Modern statehood consists of two dimensions: historically 
developed and relatively stable institutional structures, and 
culturally defined social processes. (Dietrich 2008, 37-38) 
The interplay between exogenous and endogenous factors indicate why a 
particular type of statebuilding has been developed in the contemporary context of 
post-conflict societies, which in the case of Kosovo has a multiethnic political-
institutional model at the forefront of the process. Nevertheless, this interplay also 
helps to analyse the difference between theory and practice, between legislation and 
implementation and between intended and unintended consequences of adopting and 
implementing a particular state model.  
Post-conflict statebuilding in Kosovo has been an externally-driven 
multifaceted process aiming to build peace, stabilise and reconcile ethnic tensions and 
to develop at the same time a functional liberal-democratic form of governance. 
Therefore, the immediate goal was to pacify the relations between Albanians and 
Serbs while keeping the province under the administration of the international 
community (UNMIK mission) until its future legal status would be resolved. 
Maintaining peace and achieving sustainable reconciliation has become part of the 
liberal statebuilding process. In Kosovo, this has consisted of adopting and 
implementing of a multiethnic liberal state-model aiming to develop the capacity to 
secure unity, perform the main tasks of a functional state and also manage ethnic 
diversity through a set of far-reaching legal and institutional framework for the 









3. Managing diversity in Kosovo: legislation vs. ground reality 
We declare Kosovo to be a democratic, secular and multiethnic 
republic, guided by the principles of non-discrimination and 
equal protection under the law. We shall protect and promote the 
rights of all communities in Kosovo and create the conditions 
necessary for their effective participation in political and 
decision-making processes.  
(Declaration of Independence, Assembly of Kosovo, 17 February 
2008). 
 
For the purpose of this paper, a minority is a group or a community that 
identifies itself as different by virtue of a shared ethnic, national, religious, cultural, 
linguistic or communal identity and has historically been marginalized by policies and 
practices of a state, and normally also constitutes a numerical minority within a state 
with a majority group. It is therefore crucial for the study of the management of 
plurality during statebuilding to establish the official position of the state as regards 
ethnic diversity and the relationship between majority and minority groups.   
The domestic context of post-war Kosovo has been challenging for the Kosovo 
Albanians’ aim to assume their new status as the majority group and build a new state, 
but also for the Kosovo Serbs and the other smaller minorities affected by the conflict 
and by the secession from Serbia. In this divided and confusing environment, trying to 
construct and secure unity has been challenging. However, Kosovo’s path to 
independence and sustainable statebuilding has required stability and the construction 
of social cohesion. These domestic factors have made it very difficult for Kosovo to 
pursue the twofold task of integrating its citizens and promoting multiethnicity 
concomitantly.  
One of the conditions for Kosovo’s partially recognized independence has been 
to show real and full commitment to respect and include Kosovo Serbs and the other 
minorities in the governance of the new state (Perritt 2009, 75). Furthermore, while 
achieving full international recognition (legal sovereignty) may remain the most 
difficult task for Kosovo, becoming capable of managing its minorities and, thus, 
protecting all its citizens equally regardless of their identity is a feature of functional 
post-ethnic conflict states (domestic sovereignty). The legitimacy of its independence 




As Migdal (2001) suggests, the lack of social solidarity/cohesion represents a 
threat to building legitimacy and domestic sovereignty, and, in the case of Kosovo, it 
may be seen as a source of permanent state weakness. Furthermore, the observations 
made in relation to Kosovo’s policies for minority rights contribute to the broader 
discussion of how in the contexts of post-colonialism, post-communism and post-
conflict statebuilding, the ideal state model has been shaped by the particularities and 
requirements of national, ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic diversity. 
After the declaration of independence on the 17 February 2008, the Constitution 
was promulgated and defined the Republic of Kosovo an independent, sovereign, 
democratic, unique and indivisible state and as a “multi-ethnic society consisting of 
Albanian and other Communities, governed democratically with full respect for 
the rule of law through its legislative, executive and judicial institutions”       
(Article 3(1)). Given the impact of the interplay between the de jure and de facto 
management of diversity in Kosovo, it is important to highlight from the start that 
declaring Kosovo a multiethnic society can be considered an overestimation of the 
ethnic diversity of its population. According to the 2011 census (Kosovo Agency of 
Statistics), Kosovo has approximately 1.7 million citizens, of which the Albanian 
majority represent approximately 93% of the entire population while the rest of 7% 
consists of Serb, Bosniak, Turkish, Gorani, Montenegrin, Croat and Roma, Ashkali, 
and Egyptian communities.1  
In concrete terms, independent Kosovo was from the start a de jure multiethnic 
society with a de facto largely homogenous society. At the same time, even if the 
emphasis of the constitution is on establishing a multiethnic civic based Kosovan 
identity, the formulation “Albanian and other Communities” differentiates the 
majority community, the Albanians, from the rest of communities, the minorities. A 
similar formulation that is used within several laws and other official documents 
singles out the Serbian community from “the other communities”, therefore suggesting 
that the risk of installing a hierarchal order (Krasniqi, 2013) of communities in Kosovo 
is both of de jure and de facto nature. Moreover, the multiethnic republican model 
adopted in Kosovo has required the extensive accommodation of ethnic diversity under 
the umbrella of an ethnically-neutral civic Kosovan identity. However, in the absence 
                                                          
1 In the context of the boycott of the census by Serbs in northern Kosovo, the data has not been 
seen as reliable. However, all estimates indicate the Albanian population at about 90%. 
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of a strong emotional attachment to the Kosovan identity, political homogenisation 
through the construction of a civic nation on a predominantly rational basis becomes 
much more challenging (Guibernau 2013, 6). 
 
Strategic terminology: “Community” not “Minority” rights 
The Law on Communities in Kosovo provides a general definition of 
communities as: 
national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious groups 
traditionally present in the Republic of Kosovo that are not in the 
majority. These groups are Serb, Turkish, Bosnian, Roma, 
Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani and other communities. Members of 
the community in the majority in the Republic of Kosovo as a 
whole who are not in the majority in a given municipality shall 
also be entitled to enjoy the rights listed in this law. 
 
This definition gives the notion of “community” a clear meaning as the 
equivalent of “minority” and, in consequence, differs from the text of the Constitution 
that includes the Albanians in the category by saying that communities are: 
“inhabitants belonging to the same national or ethnic, linguistic, or religious group 
traditionally present on the territory of the Republic of Kosovo” (Chapter III, Art. 57). 
Moreover, by using this general understanding of “communities”, the Constitution 
further divides the notion in two categories: “non-majority communities” and 
“majority community” (Albanians), which are both also present in the constitutional 
text and in other laws and official documents of Kosovo.  
These inconsistencies of using the term “community” instead of “minority” and 
of also giving different definitions derive from the intention to avoid referring to any 
group as minorities (Andelkovic 2012). This came as a consequence of Kosovo’s 
unsettled status under Resolution 1244 and the symbolically important divisions of the 
past between “constitutive and/or non-constitutive nations” (KIPRED 2006, 6). 
Resolution 1244 preserves the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY), suggesting that Kosovo Serbs identify themselves as the majority community 
in the general context of FRY. At the same time, Kosovo Albanians reject any legal 




It is also important to say that, initially, both the Constitution and the Law on 
Communities mentioned only 7 minorities in Kosovo (Serb, Turkish, Bosnian, Roma, 
Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani) by omitting the Montenegrin and the Croatian 
communities. As a result, until recently these two minorities were not protected by the 
Kosovo legislation in the post-independence period and, for instance, were not 
awarded guaranteed seats in the parliament and were not included as ethnic categories 
in the 2011 Census. After three years of lobbying and discussion on this issue (Balkans 
Insight 2012), Kosovo authorities agreed to include Montenegrin and Croatian as 
minority communities and amended the Law on Communities on December 2011. 
However, the two communities have remained unrepresented in the Assembly during 
the last electoral mandate.  
Fundamental constitutional provisions  
The Constitution of Kosovo not only has a chapter on minority rights but also 
includes special guarantees for participation of non-majority communities in the 
decision-making process at all levels of governance. To start with, the power-sharing 
tools that have been included in Kosovo’s constitution can be identified as follows: 
grand coalition government (ministers from minority groups must be included in the 
executive; role of community consultative bodies), proportionality (composition of 
parliament and the judiciary, electoral system, local government and employment in 
public administration and state-owned companies), veto rights (right to veto on 
constitutional amendment procedures and on the adoption of vital laws and 
amendment procedures) and segmental autonomy (special cultural autonomy and 
protection for minorities as regards language, religion, education, media and symbols). 
The most visible political rights of representation are therefore the guaranteed 
seats in the Assembly and the less visible is their participation within other institutions 
(vice-president, deputy-mayor and deputy-chair or deputy-speaker in local 
assemblies). At the central level, Kosovo Serbs have hold several important 
government offices, including a deputy prime minister, three ministerial and two 
deputy ministerial posts. Moreover, the director of the Prime Minister’s Office of 
Communities Affairs (OCA) has been a Serb, while five others have been appointed 
to the Consultative Council for Communities (CCC), the advisory body operating 
under the auspices of the President of Kosovo. (OSCE 2011, 33)  
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Furthermore, Article 58 of the Constitution describes the proactive 
responsibilities of the state to help minority groups protect and promote their 
identities, to support reconciliation, to develop and enforce anti-discrimination 
measures, to promote socio-economic, political and cultural equality, to preserve 
cultural and religious heritage of all communities and to ensure that all communities 
and their members exercise their constitutional rights.  
These responsibilities highlight the positive role that must be taken by state 
institutions and bodies not only to avoid discrimination but also to achieve equality 
among communities. Moreover, “the Republic of Kosovo shall refrain from policies 
or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to Communities against their 
will, and shall protect these persons from any action aimed at such assimilation” (CCC 
website). Therefore, not only the Kosovo Constitution makes the state responsible and 
proactive in the promotion and protection of minorities, but it also specifies that 
policies or practices of assimilation are outlawed and against the multiethnic character 
of Kosovo.  
In spite of significant criticism from both supporters and opponents of Kosovo’s 
independence (Personal Interviews 2012/2013), the provisions included in the CSP 
document remained the cornerstone of the multiethnic democratic model of 
governance installed in Kosovo. Therefore, in addition to the constitutional 
framework, by signing several fundamental laws and especially the Law on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Communities and their Members, the 
Kosovo government has constructed a solid system of rights that “should meet 
Kosovo’s international commitments and requirements for European integration, as 
long as they are effectively implemented” (ECMI 2009, 16). 
Kosovo has developed a complex system for minority rights protection that even 
though it was not envisaged by all its minority communities, it was necessary for 
dealing with the new position of Serbs in Kosovo (Personal Interviews 2012 and 2013). 
From this point of view, Kosovo was defined as a multiethnic society so as to help 
with establishing power-sharing institutions and to give ethnic autonomy and 
representation as part of the international peace-building toolbox. Nevertheless, all 
these measures will have a great impact on the long-term as they are also designed to 





4. Post-independence opportunities and challenges for the integration of 
Serbs  
This section aims to explain how the adoption of the Constitution of Kosovo and 
the implementation of key legislation on minority rights protection have influenced 
the integration of the Serb community in the post-independence context. The focus on 
promoting a multiethnic democratic model of governance with important 
consociational elements of power-sharing for Kosovo has pushed reforms to integrate 
minority communities. In the context of building a multiethnic Kosovo through legal, 
institutional and administrative reforms, a dilemma discussed here is regarding the 
balance between de jure measures for the integration of minorities with focus on 
Kosovo Serbs and the de facto implementation process targeting political, socio-
economic, legal and cultural rights of minorities. 
Firstly, regarding the issue of commitment to foster the integration and 
implementation of minority rights, the level of understanding and the acceptance of 
the new context by both the majority Albanians and the Serbs (Personal Interviews 
with Serbian/Albanian representatives, 2012) indicates that Kosovo’s official pledge 
to multiethnicity has many limitations too.  
Secondly, the institutional capacity to deal with the integration and 
accommodation of minorities plays a fundamental role in helping Serbs to assume their 
rights and integrate as equal political partners. However, this has not been fully 
developed and Kosovo has a poor capacity to support its constitutional commitments 
to the management of diversity given its overall severe socio-economic problems and 
its limited experience as a new state (ICG report 2012 AND Personal Interviews 
2012/2013).  
After the war and in the new post-independence context, the position of Kosovo 
Serbs has remained dependent on Serbia. The installation of the parallel education, 
health, hospital and police systems in northern Kosovo close to the Serbian border and 
in enclaves where Serbs are a majority has been of great support for the Serb 
community (ICG report 2012, 16). However, this undermines the authority of Kosovo 
and as long as it cannot replace and compete with the parallel system, the integration 
of Serbs can remain unsustainable.  
On-going language barriers and separate Albanian and Serbian health and 
education systems are negative factors for long-term inter-ethnic dialogue and 
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reconciliation, with the reality being that after the declaration of independence, many 
members of the Kosovo Serb community continue to live separately from the majority 
(Personal Interviews 2012/2013). This is the dominant view among Kosovo Serbs as 
regards the tools for protecting and integrating them in the post-independence context 
and as one civil society representative observes: 
The provisions for minorities can also be seen from a different angle. 
After the war, Serbs have been actually become isolated in in Kosovo 
and more or less forced to leave in small enclaves that are now being 
turned into municipalities  
(Personal Interview with Serb CSO representative 2013). 
 
At the same time, Serbia has continued to reject Kosovo’s independence and has 
been supporting parallel institutions, which consequently undermine the Kosovo 
government’s ability to develop inclusive democratic institutions and persuade 
Kosovo Serbs to legitimise its authority (ICG report 2012). While in some regions the 
presence of parallel institutions is mostly symbolic, in others, they deliver the bulk of 
the local governance and services required by the Kosovo Serb community, including 
administration, education and health.  
However, the post-2008 transfer of competencies to the local level and the 
creation of new Kosovo municipalities with Serb majority has reduced their influence 
(ECMI 2013).  In response, the Government of Serbia has begun to streamline and 
restructure its institutions and service provision in Kosovo. Unlike the Serbs in the 
north who live in a mono-ethnic environment, a growing number of Serbs in the south 
have been more willing to cooperate with Pristina, pending concrete and tangible 
measures of good will are offered by the Kosovo Government and the international 
community. The formula that some Serbs have adopted has been to respect the laws of 
Kosovo without accepting its full independence and to sustain decentralization as a 
vital process that will ensure their future in Kosovo (ICG report 2013). As many Serb 
political and civil society representatives in Kosovo highlight, it is essential that 
Kosovo’s leaders show openness and understanding to this political evolution.  
All these issues have been particularly significant in the context of the Belgrade-
Pristina dialogue, which began after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concluded 
in July 2010 that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration “did not violate any applicable rule 
of international law” (International Court of Justice 2010: 53). The negotiations 
mediated by the EU have been addressing the normalisation of the relations between 
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Serbia and Kosovo as regards regional cooperation, freedom of movement, rule of law 
and economic development.  
Kosovo and Serbia reached an EU brokered agreement for the normalisation of 
relations on 19 April 2013 in Brussels. The agreement had 15 points and focused on 
the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb municipalities, integration of 
Serb justice and security structures into Kosovo’s state apparatus, and the management 
of municipal elections. Moreover, the two parts agreed that neither side “will block, or 
encourage others to block, the other side's progress in their respective EU path” (First 
Agreement 2013). Despite this important point addressing the mutual respect vis-à-vis 
the common goal of European integration, the text of the agreement is ambiguous and 
has made its implementation a rather difficult process and subject to the interests of 
both sides:  
For Pristina the Agreement means that the territorial integrity of 
Kosovo has been secured. So called “parallel structures” are abolished 
and North Kosovo and its Serbian population will be fully integrated 
according to the Kosovar constitution.  
Belgrade reads the Agreement differently: In its view a new ethnic-
Serbian institution will be created, which for the first time is 
recognized by Pristina and the EU (Ernst 2014, 123) 
As the next section of this article will show, one particular impact of the 
Dialogue and the Brussels Agreement has been on the actual participation of Serbs in 
Kosovo politics. While both Serbia and Kosovo aspire EU membership and seek to 
win EU appeal in the mediation process (Todoric and Malazogu 2011: 12), the process 
of dialogue has had a paradoxical effect by strengthening the influence of Belgrade 
over the Serb minority instead of including Serbs within Kosovo’s structures so as to 
legitimise Pristina’s authority. This will be illustrated by analysing the volatile 
character of the political participation and representation of Kosovo Serbs since the 
2008 declaration of independence.  
 
Serbian de jure vs. de facto participation within Kosovo politics 
Kosovo is a parliamentary democracy and according the Constitution, and 
repeated in the Law on General elections, its unicameral Assembly has 120 deputies. 
Representatives of minority communities have guaranteed a number of 20 seats. Ten 
of the guaranteed seats are for Kosovo Serbs and ten for the other communities.  
Minority communities are also guaranteed one of five deputy presidents in the 
Assembly presidency.  
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For the first two electoral mandates upon the adoption of the constitution, 
minorities in Kosovo had an additional advantage of also participating in the 
distribution of the 100 seats outside the guaranteed ones. 2 Moreover, the 5% threshold 
necessary for regular political parties did not apply to minority parties, which helped 
the Independent Liberal Party (SLS) to become part of the governing coalition despite 
the fact that they received only 2.05% of the votes in the elections (KIPRED 2011). 
Therefore, because of the set-aside seat system for minority political parties, the 2010 
general elections allowed Serb parties to win 3 additional regular seats, which meant 
that between 2010 and 2014 the Assembly had 13 Serb deputies representing 3 parties, 
8 of which were from SLS.  
Overall, the minority political parties had together 25 out of 120 seats in the 
parliament, representing 20% of the total number of deputies and making them the 
second biggest parliamentary caucus. This opportunity for minority parties to have 
such strong decision-making power is even more noteworthy given that in 2010 they 
won the 25 seats with approximately only 55,000 votes altogether while, for example, 
the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) Albanian party came second in the election 
by receiving around 170,000 votes and won 27 seats (ECMI 2011). 
In the post-independence immediate context, the Serb caucus in the Kosovo 
Assembly was mainly divided between the pro-government Independent Liberal Party 
(Samostalna Liberalna Stranka, SLS) and opposition United Serb List (Jedinstvena 
srpska lista, JSL). At that time, the international presence in Kosovo was seeking to 
support a new generation of Serb political elites and SLS focused on adapting to the 
new context and on what would be more beneficial for the Serb community rather than 
focusing on the political problems around Kosovo’s unsettled status (ICG 2012, 7).  
However, their attitude was perceived by Belgrade and its parallel institutions in 
Kosovo as an act of betrayal (Personal Interviews with SLS politicians 2012).  As a 
result, SLS had little support in the beginning and had to face opposition even from 
the Serb community in South Kosovo.  
Nonetheless, one section of the Serb community in Kosovo understood the fact 
that the post-conflict and post-independence context had inevitably changed their 
status and their position within Kosovo. Thus, SLS became the “voice” of the Serbs 
who did not want to or simply could not depart and who realized that remaining in 
                                                          
2 Article 148, Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, p.57. 
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total opposition and silent within Kosovo politics would have been detrimental for 
themselves (Personal interviews with Serb politicians and civil society representatives 
2012/2013). The growing support for SLS was evidenced by the number of votes 
received in 2010 (14,352) compared to 2007 when SLS participated in elections for 
the first time and managed to get only 855 votes (Kosovo Central Electoral 
Commission CEC). The 2010 results made SLS, together with The New Kosova 
Alliance (AKR) the fifth biggest party in the Assembly and the largest minority party. 
Furthermore, after the 2010 elections SLS had two ministers in the government, 
a great reward for SLS joining the governing coalition as holding such important 
positions exceeded constitutional rights.3  
 
The 2013 and 2014 Elections: A new dominant coalition for the Serbs 
A turning point for the political participation and representation of Serbs in 
Kosovo was the November 2013 Local Elections. Of the total 103 political entities that 
participated in the elections, there were 27 representing the Serb community (Brajshori 
and Tërnava 2013, 8).  
These elections came five years after the declaration of independence and, for 
the first time, they covered the whole territory of Kosovo, including therefore the four 
Serb-majority municipalities in the northern part of the country. Moreover, in the 
context of the agreement reached between Belgrade and Pristina in April 2013, Serbia 
supported and encouraged the participation of Serbs in these local elections with the 
general aim of securing control at the local level.  
A crucial change also came with the entrance in the elections of a new Serb 
political entity, the Civic Initiative “Srpska” (GIS), created and financed by Belgrade 
and bringing together the Serb parties in Kosovo linked with the Serbian government 
(Deda 2013, 3). The support of Belgrade for these elections proved to have a major 
impact on mobilizing the Serb minority in Kosovo as shown by the high turnout rates: 
over 50% on average for the Serb municipalities, clearly over the Kosovo average 
turnout of 46% in the first round (ECMI 2013). 
The results confirmed a strong dominance for the newcomer GIS Srpska as it 
won 9 out of 10 municipalities in mayoral elections and a total of 40% of the seats held 
                                                          
3 The constitution says that the government shall have a minimum of two non-Albanian ministers 
(one Serb and one from another minority community) and four minority deputy ministers (two Serb 
and two from other non-majority communities). 
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by Serb representatives in municipal assemblies throughout Kosovo (Tërnava 2014, 
8). Therefore, this victory marginalized SLS and the other Serb parties, while also 
predicting that GIS Srpska would “become the dominant political force of Kosovo 
Serbs in the 2014 national elections and most likely the third political force represented 
in Kosovo Assembly (through the guaranteed minority seats) and the next Serb party 
in the future government of Kosovo. This will make Serbia a de-facto governing 
partner of the next government of Kosovo” (Deda 2013, 3).  
The 2013 elections suggested the development of a new political landscape for 
the Kosovo Serbs and a departure from the pro-government strategy materialized by 
the presence of SLS in the governing coalition with the Albanian majority parties. The 
new dominant political representation for Kosovo Serbs at the local level may manifest 
in the form of a more radical policy in its relationship with the Pristina authorities as 
suggested, for instance, by the declaration of the elected mayor of North Mitrovica, 
Krstimir Pantić: “We have won nine municipalities where Serb citizens will never 
recognize the independence of Kosovo” (ECMI 2013).  
As regards the 2014 parliamentary elections, the impact of the “normalisation” 
of the relations between Kosovo and Serbia (Guzina and Marijan 2014) was again 
visible in the participation of northern Serb municipalities and in the almost doubled 
number of recorded votes among Kosovo Serbs compared to the 2010 elections (from 
24,138 to 46,663) (ECMI 2014, 10). Moreover, as anticipated, the Belgrade-backed 
G.I. Srpska coalition won the majority of votes from the Serbian community to replace 
the SLS’ supremacy (8 out of 14 Serb seats between 2010-2014) and gaining 9 of the 
10 guaranteed seats for Kosovo Serbs in the Assembly.4  
Lastly, what needs to be mentioned about the 2014 elections results is that the 
main Albanian party, PDK, faced great difficulties in trying to form again a new 
government under its command. Even though the Serbs MPs still represent a potential 
important parliamentary group capable of supporting a future coalition, the new 
political environment and the clear statement made by the Belgrade-oriented Srpska 
that it would not join an eventual cabinet with the nationalist Vetëvendosje (Self-
Determination Movement) (B92 news 2014), has made the future role of the 
community’s political representatives much more difficult to predict.  
                                                          
4 The 2014 elections introduced the Guaranteed Seats System for the representation of minorities 





(In)effectiveness of strong minority representation 
By law, the extensive rights and powers that representatives of Kosovo Serbs 
and other minorities have been awarded give them the consociational option to block 
important government actions that may undermine their interests. In reality, the 
situation has been more modest as minority representatives have lacked the political 
will to put pressure on the central institutions because they depended on the support of 
the Albanian main parties and they did not want to jeopardise their positions or create 
problems for the community they have represented (Personal Interviews with CSO 
representatives and Kosovo MPs 2012/2013). Moreover, as regards the consociational 
character of the executive, despite minority representation at the highest level of 
governance, the system is weak. If ministers from minority communities are MPs, then 
they do not necessarily require majority support from minority MPs, meaning that “the 
system is more concerned with minority representation than with minority consent” 
(Bieber 2013, 138). 
In order for minorities to represent a stronger and effective political force, there 
is need for more consensus among their representatives. This is difficult to achieve and 
maintain given that opportunism or self-interest can be exploited by the main parties 
to place different groups or politicians against each other. Although the public political 
debate is focused on policies and governmental strategies, voters of all communities 
in Kosovo believe that their political representatives are fighting to prolong their stay 
in power to maximize their own private gains at the expense of their constituencies 
(UNDP Pulse Reports 2010-2014). 
In this sense, the post-2010 government coalition depended on the votes of 
minority representatives who, despite constantly complaining about the position of 
their communities (Personal Interviews with minority MPs 2012/2013), they have not 
entirely used this political leverage to advance their influence and become more active 
in spite of having the institutional tools to protect their rights.5 Instead, they continued 
to be fragmented and in competition with their political rivals: 
Infighting, mutual accusations of corruption and cronyism and 
jockeying for better positions with Belgrade, Pristina and key 
embassies are the main features of Serb politics […] Many in the 
                                                          
5 This behaviour was confirmed by most NGOs working with minority rights protection in Kosovo, 
Personal Interviews 2012/2013, Pristina, Kosovo. 
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Serb population are left disillusioned, while youth interested in 
social, economic and political development finds a home in the 
growing NGO sector (ICG 2012, 8). 
At the same time, the growing participation of Kosovo Serbs in local and 
national elections has been a positive development for building the legitimacy of both 
their political representatives and the institutions these work for. This positive trend 
nonetheless challenges the argument that the only obstacle to integration is the lack of 
will that characterizes the Serb community. As Briscoe and Price (2011, 33) put it, 
“[t]here is no shortage of other institutions, provisions and procedures designed to 
safeguard and promote minority participation. The challenge is getting ethnic Serbs to 
use the mechanisms and participate in the political process”.  
The idea of convincing Serbs to use political mechanisms is not only about how 
much willingness there is within the community but also about the capacity of Kosovo 
Serbs to actually take advantage of all their constitutional privileges that reach far 
beyond using elections to gain strong political representation. However, even in the 
case of total participation, the de facto integration and acceptance of the Serbs would 
continue to be a challenge as long as the general position and perception of the 
community does not include recognition of Kosovo’s new status. 
 
5. Intended and unintended consequences of statebuilding  
As this article has suggested, a first challenge for the integration of Kosovo Serbs 
derives from the community’s will and capacity to understand, accept and assume their 
rights (Personal Interviews with Serb MPs 2012/2013). A second challenge for the 
Kosovo Serbs has been that the central and local institutions have not been willing to 
actively encourage and support them. Besides adopting the current constitutional 
framework, Kosovo institutions also need to prove long-term commitment and build 
capacity to sustain its minorities. A third challenge is the sustainability of the 
cooperation between Serbs and Albanians at both elite and community levels, as the 
political cooperation build so far is contested not only by the Albanian opposition and 
the civil society but also by the Serb community itself (Personal Interviews with Serb 
MPs 2012/2013). These issues highlight not only the Kosovo-specific endogenous 
“gap in conceptions of authority” (Ponzio 2011, 35), but also some of the chief 
difficulties in synchronising “stateness” and “nationness” (Linz and Stepan 1996) 
during the process of post-conflict statebuilding. 
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Overall, given the opportunities provided by the complex system of minority 
rights in post-independence Kosovo, there have been some positive results with the 
integration of Serbs (European Commission 2008-2013; ICG report 2012; UNDP 
2012). The main progress has however been made only at the upper level as shown by 
the political representation of Kosovo Serbs within the Assembly, the minority 
consultative bodies, the government and the municipal institutions (MRG report 2009). 
Even though signs of progress at the community level are indicated by the higher 
turnout in national and local elections, Kosovo Serbs have continued to rely on the 
existence of the parallel system and have limited socio-economic incentives to accept 
Pristina’s authority (Personal Interviews with Serb MPs 2012/2013). 
While pragmatic strategies and policies have been somehow effective at the 
higher level of representation and participation of Serbs, they have not been properly 
applied at the community level in order to motivate and create sustainable 
opportunities for all members of the Serb minority to integrate. In other words, the 
legislative framework and the formal provisions for protecting minority rights cannot 
fully compensate for practical needs. 
More specifically, while political integration and representation have developed 
quickly at the elite level, Kosovo Serbs continue to be highly segregated at the 
community level (ICG report 2012). This has been a consequence of the lack of 
willingness within the community to accept the authority of Pristina and of the rights 
and privileges at central and local levels of governance that do not encourage cross-
ethnic relations (MRG 2009). In contrast with the aim to secure the obedience of the 
Serb minority after empowering them, the post-independence developments suggest 
that Kosovo Serbs have actually assumed their political rights and have developed 
local self-governance mainly in line with the policy of anti-establishment and non-
recognition of the central authority of Kosovo (KIPRED 2008 & 2012).  
Therefore, these issues reinforce the idea that both exogenous and endogenous 
factors have the ability to keep political authority away from the state: “both forces 
originating outside the boundaries that the state claims for itself and those within its 
borders have contested state efforts to monopolize the exercising of authority. The 
result has been the limited state” (Migdal 2001, 263). 
The various interpretation and application of minority rights has been dependent 
not only on the support of the Kosovo authorities but also on the socio-economic and 
political situation of the community, as well as on its diverse necessities. On the one 
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hand, it is vital to underline the benefits and positive impact of the promotion of 
diversity and the protection of all minorities in Kosovo so as to ensure they can retain 
their identities. On the other hand, it should be affirmed that instead of protecting 
minorities, the institutional focus on multiethnicity may also foster new divisions by 
promoting and focusing solely on the ethno-political identity of different communities 
(MRG report 2009 AND Personal Interviews 2012/2013). As indicated by the political 
and social developments in post-independence Kosovo (volatility of electoral results, 
political participation and representation, political crises), there is evidence in Kosovo 
of tension not only between the Albanian majority, the Serbs and other minorities, but 
also among the non-Serb minorities themselves (Deda 2013; ICG 2012 AND Personal 
Interviews 2012/2013). 
The study of post-2008 Kosovo suggests that the mechanisms aiming to integrate 
and accommodate minorities in Kosovo have been developed based on an assumption 
rather than on an indisputable claim that these groups are not integrated and, thus, they 
would all need the same measures to address their political, social, economic and 
cultural rights.  Given the priority to integrate the Serb community, the specific post-
ethnic conflict tools for reconciliation through power-sharing arrangements were 
accepted as necessary and appropriate for non-Serb minorities as well (Personal 
Interviews 2012/2013). Consociational power-sharing measures have enabled elite 
level representation, participation and cooperation with the majority and other 
minority communities and it has become a source of legitimacy in Kosovo. However, 
in the long run, similarly to other cases in the Western Balkans like Bosnia, these 
restrictive mechanisms for the protection of minorities can lead to institutionalizing 
ethnicity (Bieber 2004) instead of facilitating cross-ethnic political cooperation and 
constructive integration that also safeguards the political and cultural future of the 
fragile minorities.   
The long-term implementation of the multiethnic framework in Kosovo has a 
double problem. Not only is the functionality of minority provisions dependent on the 
actual capacities and willingness of each community, but their lack of appropriateness 
in relation to the particular circumstances of minorities can make them 
counterproductive (Personal Interviews with minority representatives 2012/2013). In 
other words, the ambiguous and top-down externally driven character of the 
multiethnic institutional and legal setting in Kosovo has also induced separation and 
insecurity by putting emphasis on group differences. 
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Certainly, in the case of Kosovo we have de-ethnicisation of state 
institutions on the one hand, but on the other, a multi-ethnic 
composition of the society reflected in politics, i.e. ethnicisation of the 
political and social status of its citizens. As a result, we have at the 
same time neutral civic state institutions, and yet the very functioning 
of the state is based on multi-ethnicity (Krasniqi 2012, 358-359). 
The shortcomings regarding the legislation-implementation gap and the 
unintended consequences analysed here indicate the serious risks that derive from 
policies and strategies vis-à-vis the management of diversity that are based on an 
ambiguous vision of statebuilding. I call it ambiguous because (de jure) statebuilding 
in Kosovo has combined elements of multiculturalism and civic republicanism but, de 
facto, it will be difficult to resolve the “tension between two different understandings 
of nationhood: territorial and political (the French model), where nationhood is 
understood as a political fact, and ethno-cultural (the German model), where 
nationhood is understood as an ethno-cultural fact” (Krasniqi 2012, 356).                           
This statebuilding dilemma also applies to the wider international context, as similar 
solutions have been adopted in neighbouring statebuilding cases like Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia and in longstanding post-conflict state formation 
processes like in Iraq and Afghanistan. What they all have in common is the perpetual 
struggle to synchronise liberal democratic norms with conditions of ethno-national, 
cultural, religious and social diversity.  
Conclusion 
This paper analysed the particular model of integrating, accommodating and 
protecting ethnic minorities in post-conflict and post-independence Kosovo and 
discussed the significance of this case-study for the general literature on contemporary 
statebuilding. The young but complex example of Kosovo underlines the difficulties 
of trying to build a multiethnic liberal democratic state and provides sufficient 
evidence to show that the statebuilding/peacebuilding literature has overemphasised 
the exogenous and imposing character of statebuilding..  
Instead, this paper examined Kosovo based on the idea that gaining legitimacy 
is at the heart of statebuilding and has adopted the limited state approach (Migdal 
2010) to highlight the transformative nature of state-society relations and their 
inevitable impact on shaping the actual form of the state. Furthermore, the legislation-
implementation gaps identified in post-independence Kosovo contributes to the 
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recurrent debates around the concepts of [domestic] sovereignty (Krasner 2004), 
democratisation (Tansey 2007), legitimacy (Ponzio 2011) and stateness (Linz and 
Stepan 1996).  
 In this respect, this research suggests that the effectiveness and the actual 
negative or positive impact of contemporary practices of post-conflict statebuilding 
are dictated by local realities to a larger extent than the existing state-centric literature 
affirms. Therefore, policy-makers and scholars should engage in more balanced and 
accurate work on exploring whether the failures of contemporary statebuilding derive 
from the lack of more case-specific solutions and mechanisms or they are intrinsically 
embedded in the peculiar Western-centric nature of the liberal-democratic state.  
Consequently, this also contributes to the broader discussion concerning how the 
interplay between developing liberal/democratic norms of governance and the focus 
on managing diversity has been a constant challenge for contemporary statebuilding. 
In the example of Kosovo, this has been illustrated by its dual task to secure unity at 
the same time while enshrining minority rights and accommodating diversity and the 
volatility of the levels of social cohesion despite the existence of a far-reaching system 
of minority rights. Consequently, the legitimacy and domestic sovereignty of Kosovo, 
conditioned by the accommodation of all its constituent communities, remain fragile 
and undermined by the enhanced risk of segregation and marginalisation. In its quest 
to build sustainable plural democratic governance, Kosovo needs more than defining 
itself as a multiethnic republic, it also needs to function like one. 
The case of Kosovo suggests that the actual character of newly built states is the 
result of the permanent tensions between liberal-democratic norms of governance and 
the conditions of plurality, between the need of social cohesion and the management 
of diversity, between intended and unintended consequences of implementation, 
between local and international understanding of authority, between national and 
subnational forms of identity and, more broadly, between the state’s image as a unitary 
and coherent political entity and the practices of different social actors and agencies 
(Migdal 2001). Therefore, within the study of contemporary statebuilding, it is 
important to constantly incorporate the role of society and the local factors that 
illustrate how values, perceptions and participation of people (representing both the 




Bieber, Florian 2004. “Institutionalizing Ethnicity in the Western Balkans: Managing 
Change in Deeply Divided Societies”, Flensburg: ECMI Working Paper, 19. 
 
Bieber, Florian 2013. “Power Sharing and Democracy in Southeast Europe” in 
Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Special Issue, 5(1): 129–48. 
Brajshori Muhamet and Tërnava Granit 2013. The Republic of Kosovo’s 2013 local 
elections handbook, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. 
Briscoe, Ivan and Price, Megan 2011. “Kosovo’s new map of power: governance and 
crime in the wake of Independence”, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 
‘Clingendael’, The Hague. 
B92 news, Sep. 17 2014, 
http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2014&mm=09&dd=17&nav_id=91
640  [last accessed: 03.06.16] 
 
Caplan, Richard 2005. International Governance of War-torn Territories: Rule and 
Reconstruction, Oxford: OUP. 
Caspersen, Nina 2012. Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the 
Modern International System, Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Chandler, David 2006. Empire in Denial: The politics of State-building, Pluto, 
London. 
Chandler, David 2010. International Statebuilding. The rise of post-liberal 
governance, Oxon: Routledge. 
Clapham, Christopher 1996. Africa and the International System: The Politics of 
State Survival, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Coggins, Bridget 2014. Power politics and state formation in the twentieth 
century: the dynamics of recognition, New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Deda, Ilir 2013. “Kosovo after the Brussels Agreement: From status quo to an internal 
ethnically divided state”, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Policy Brief. 
  
Dietrich, Jung 2008. “State Formation and State-Building: Is there a lesson to learn 
from Sociology?” in Engberg-Pedersen et al. (eds.) DIIS Report. Fragile Situations. 
Background Papers. 
 
ECMI Kosovo Report 2009. “Strengthening the Institutional System for Communities 
in Post-Independence Kosovo”. 
 
ECMI Kosovo Information Bulletin 2013. “Kosovo Local Elections 2013: Lessons 




ECMI Kosovo Informational Bulletin 2014. “Minority Communities' Political Parties 
in Kosovo’s Changing Political Landscape: the General Elections of June 2014 and 
their Aftermath”. 
 
Egnell, Robert and Halden, Peter 2013. “Introduction: The Need for New Agendas in 
Statebuilding” in Robert Egnell and Peter Halden (eds.) New Agendas in 
Statebuilding: Hybridity, Contingency, and History, London: Routledge. 
Ernst, Andreas 2014. “The April Agreement - A Step towards Normalization 
between Belgrade and Pristina?” Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 1(1): 122-126. 
European Commission (EC) – EU Enlargement Strategy and Progress (Kosovo 
Analytical Progress Reports) 2008-2013. 
Guibernau, Montserrat 2013. Belonging: Solidarity and Division in Modern Societies, 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Guzina Dejan and Marijan Branka 2014. “A Fine Balance: The EU and the Process of 
Normalizing Kosovo-Serbia Relations”, CIGI papers, no.23. 
 
Hehir Aidan 2010. Kosovo, Intervention And Statebuilding: The International 
Community And The Transition To Independence, New York: Routledge. 
Hehir, Aidan 2010. “Introduction: Kosovo and the international community”, in Aidan 
Hehir (ed.) Kosovo, Intervention and Statebuilding: The International Community and 
the Transition to Independence, London: Routledge, pp. 1-16.  
International Crisis Group (ICG) Report 2012. “Setting Kosovo Free: Remaining 
Challenges”, no. 218. 
ICG Report 2013. “Serbia and Kosovo: The Path to Normalisation”, no. 223. 
Ignatieff, Michael 2003. Empire lite: nation building in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, London: Vintage. 
Jackson, Robert 1990. Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the 
Third Word, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Jackson, Robert 2007. Sovereignty: Evolution of an Idea, Cambridge, Polity Press.  
Ker-Lindsay, James 2009. Kosovo: the path to contested statehood in the Balkans, 
London: I.B. Taurus. 
Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED) 2006. “Integration 
of minority communities in the post-status Kosovo”, Pristina. 
 
KIPRED Policy Brief 2008, “Kosovo Serbs after the Declaration of Independence: the 
right momentum for. Confidence Building Measures”. 
 
KIPRED 2012 “Strengthening the statehood of Kosovo through the democratization 




Kostovicova, Denisa 2005. Kosovo: The Politics of Identity and Space. London: 
Routledge.  
Kostovicova, Denisa and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna 2013. “Introduction: civil society 
and multiple transitions – meanings, actors and effects” in Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 
James Ker-Lindsay, and Denisa Kostovicova, (eds.) Civil Society and Transitions in 
the Western Balkans. New perspectives on South-East Europe, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan: 1-25. 
 
Kostovicova, Denisa and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna (eds.) 2009. Persistent state 
weakness in the global age, London: Ashgate. 
Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.   
Krasniqi, Gëzim 2012. “Overlapping jurisdictions, disputed territory, unsettled state: 
the perplexing case of citizenship in Kosovo”, Citizenship Studies, 16 (3-4), pp. 353-
66. 
Krasniqi, Gëzim 2013. “Equal Citizens, Uneven ‘Communities’: Differentiated and 
Hierarchical Citizenship in Kosovo”, CITSEE Working Paper, 2013/27. 
 
Linz, Juan. J. and Stepan, Alfred 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Migdal, Joel S. 2001. State in Society. Studying How States and Societies Transform 
and Constitute One Another, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Minority Rights Group International (MRG) 2009. “Filling the Vacuum: Ensuring 
Protection and Legal Remedies for Minorities in Kosovo”. 
Paris, Roland 1997. “Peacebuilding and the Limit of Liberal Internationalism”, 
International Security, 22 (2).  
Perritt, Henry 2009. The Road to Independence for Kosovo: a Chronicle of the 
Ahtisaari Plan, Cambridge: CUP. 
Personal Interview with Lutfi Haziri, PDK MP and ex-minister of Culture and Local 
Self-Governance, Head of the Negotiation Team for Kosovo, 08.05.2012, Pristina, 
Kosovo.   
 
Personal Interview with Suzana Andelkovic, Advisor Ministry of Communities and 
Return, 29.05.2012, Fushe Kosove.   
 
Personal Interviews with politicians and civil society members representing minority 
communities, Pristina, Prizren, February-June 2012 and 2013. 
 
Ponzio, Richard 2011. Democratic Peacebuilding: Aiding Afghanistan, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Richmond, Oliver. P. and Franks, Jason 2009. Liberal Peace Transitions: Between. 
Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.  
Nationalities Papers 
 31 
Samuels, Kirsti and von Einsiedel, Sebastian 2004. “The Future of UN State-
Building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of War in Iraq” in 
International Peace Academy Policy Report, New York: IPA.  
Tansey, Oisín 2007. “Democratization without a State: Democratic Regime-building 
in Kosovo” in Democratization, 14 (1): 129–150. 
  
Tërnava, Granit 2014. Local elections in Kosovo Final Results, Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung Report 
 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2012. “Kosovo Human Development 
Report”. 
 
UNDP Public Pulse Reports for Kosovo, I-VII, 2010-2014. 
 
Weller, Marc 2009. Contested statehood: Kosovo's struggle for independence, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Wilmer, Franke 2006. “Minority Rights and Charles Tilly’s “Stateness””, 
Constitutionalism Web-papers, ConWEB, No 3/2006. 
Yannis, Alexandros 2001. “Kosovo Under International Administration”, Survival, 
43(2): 31-48.  
Zaum, Dominik 2007. The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politics of 
International Statebuilding, Oxford: OUP. 
 
 
